New Article: The New Space Race with China
China has launched hundreds of rockets and built a space industry second only to SpaceX. The United States is now in a space race that decision-makers and the public are barely aware of.
This article by Oberon Dixon-Luinenburg was published in PALLADIUM 17: Universal Man, our spring print edition, on March 26, 2025. Subscribe now to receive your copy.
On January 23rd, three hundred miles southwest of Beijing, a rocket the size of a fifteen-story building ascended on a thundering pillar of flame from the Taiyuan spaceport. It was carrying a five-ton payload: a batch of eighteen satellites for the Qianfan (“Thousand Sails”) satellite internet project. There have been four Thousand Sails launches so far, with 72 now in orbit. Many more will be launched this year.
Thousand Sails will be a “megaconstellation,” a new category of orbital satellite constellations that number in the thousands. SpaceX’s Starlink is the first and biggest such megaconstellation, with seven thousand satellites in orbit, a feat China aims to match. Thousand Sails is scheduled to have over one thousand satellites by 2027 and 14,000 in the 2030s. These are credible plans, both because there are no new technical challenges to overcome and because Chinese space organizations have had a good track record in recent decades of achieving their announced timelines.
Other Chinese constellations are also underway, such as the more secretive and defense-oriented Guowang (“National Net”) project run by the state-owned enterprise China SatNet, which current plans also place at 13,000 satellites by 2035. The first ten National Net satellites were launched on December 16, 2024, this time on a rocket with three times the payload capacity. Details are unclear from public information, but the rocket lift capacity suggests these new satellites may be the size of Starlink V3 satellites (close to 2,000 kilograms). SpaceX has not yet deployed Starlink V3, which will provide substantially higher network capacity; the company is waiting on the higher payload offered by Starship, their new launch vehicle.
China now has over 800 satellites in orbit, recently having overtaken the United Kingdom for second-most behind the United States. While the United States might seem far ahead at almost 9000, as recently as 2017 the U.S. had less than 800 satellites in orbit. Once new launch vehicles are developed, the number of Chinese satellites might quickly increase to match or exceed those launched by the United States. There is a revolution underway in space technology, with the United States leading and only China catching up. These are by no means the only Chinese space accomplishments in recent years.
The day after the first National Net deployment, Chinese astronauts Cai Xuzhe and Song Lingdong broke the record for the longest spacewalk in human history. The Chinese astronauts spent over nine hours working on maintenance and upgrades to the Chinese Tiangong (“Heavenly Palace”) space station, circling the Earth six times before their work was done. New, more lightweight and flexible Chinese spacesuits helped make this long spacewalk less tiring and dangerous. These achievements are not exceptional but expected for the modern Chinese space industry. Gone are the days of infrequent launches and deep caution.
In 2024, China launched 68 orbital rockets—a new record, and lagging behind only the United States. There were two failures in the growing commercial launch sector, but other commercial launches were successful. Recent Chinese successes in space have ranged from the Tianwen-1 (“Heavenly Questions”) mission, driving a rover around the Martian surface for almost a year from 2021 to 2022, to commercial satellite launches for friendly nations, to a series of lunar exploration missions, starting with the Chang’e-1 lunar orbiter in 2007 and including the Chang’e-6 mission in 2024, which was the first mission by any nation to return samples from the dark side of the Moon. The United States undeniably finds itself in a new space race that its politicians and the American public barely know anything about. Unless that changes, it might well be a space race the Western superpower ends up losing.
The Chinese Plan to Outdo the Apollo Program
In the wake of the second successful Chinese lunar sample-return mission, Chinese paramount leader Xi Jinping met with space program leaders in September 2024 and redoubled his emphasis on space achievements in the pursuit of national greatness, encouraging accelerated development. Xi has made his goals clear: to “explore the vast universe” and “become a great power in space.” The requirements for great power status, however, are relative. Cai and Song’s record-setting spacewalk was only barely longer than the old record after all—just enough for a news headline.
China’s space program, carried out by the China National Space Administration (CNSA), has become a focal point in building up national prestige and an aspirational mindset. Tellingly, contemporary CNSA program names such as the Chang’e series of lunar missions—named after the Chinese Moon goddess—draw from Chinese mythology rather than the history of revolutionary communism as with the Long March rockets—programs that began in an era when the Soviet Union, not just the United States, was far ahead in space technology.
Chinese lunar exploration has clearly become focused on sending a crewed mission to the Moon and landing astronauts on its surface, matching the United States’ accomplishment and prestige as currently the only country whose astronauts have walked on the Moon. The Chinese intend to go this decade too: current plans schedule a manned landing for 2030. After that, they intend to build a Moon base.
Various state-owned enterprises within the Chinese space industry are working on improving all the technologies they have developed over the last decade to help achieve this goal. These projects include more advanced spacesuits, a lunar lander, and, most importantly, a new super heavy-lift rocket. By U.S. conventions, a super heavy-lift rocket is one that delivers fifty metric tons to low Earth orbit (LEO). The Long March 10 rocket has a stated capacity clocking in at seventy metric tons to LEO and 27 to trans-lunar injection—the more energetically expensive trajectory required to reach the Moon. The first test flight is planned for 2026.
The third and final module of the Tiangong space station was installed in 2022. Launched on a Long March 5B rocket, the Mengtian (“Dreaming of the Heavens”) module weighed 23,000 kg at launch and had to be accelerated to over seven kilometers per second to achieve a stable orbit four hundred kilometers above the Earth’s surface. Delivering to the existing modules with a crew on board required careful orbit alignment and a large robot arm to help manipulate the module into place. This was the realization of a plan conceived in the early 1990s. Chinese astronauts have inhabited the Tiangong station ever since, performing countless spacewalks, experiments, and live streams for the Chinese public.
The construction of the first permanent space station is not just an achievement in and of itself but a crucial stepping stone for manned missions deeper in space. Tiangong and the International Space Station (ISS) are the only space stations humans today operate in the Earth’s orbit. While the ISS is set to be decommissioned in the coming years, the Chinese space agency is preparing a new space telescope module to be launched in 2026 and periodically dock to their space station. The Chinese station has seen notable research take place, including experiments such as microgravity rice cultivation for feeding crews on long space voyages and tests of artificial photosynthesis to produce ingredients for rocket fuel.
China’s Space Industry is Second Only to SpaceX
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has enjoyed decades of being an undisputed leader in space exploration and orbital infrastructure, with more advanced satellites and more ambitious missions than any other power. However, U.S. orbital launches were very expensive: the Space Shuttle program was ultimately a failure when it came to making a reusable launch vehicle that was actually cost-effective. Russian rockets were the cheapest mass-to-orbit system into the 2000s and, as the Space Shuttle was phased out, were necessary for ferrying American astronauts to the ISS.
Elon Musk's SpaceX changed that and single-handedly brought about U.S. dominance in launch vehicles. The company’s success in developing vertical-takeoff vertical-landing (VTVL) rockets unlocked much more efficient reusability than the Space Shuttle ever did. With reusability, you don’t need to build a completely new rocket for every launch, merely refurbish and refuel it for the next flight. Truly reusable VTVL launch vehicles are effectively impossible for single-use rockets to compete with. The typical price an external customer pays for a SpaceX Falcon 9 launch bottoms out at roughly $2500/kg, with an up to 23 metric ton payload to LEO, depending on the configuration. Elon Musk, in 2020, even estimated the marginal per-launch cost for Falcon 9 at about $15 million, which is under $1000/kg. The price is widely considered the best available.
While launch costs are difficult to directly compare due to the unique requirements of each customer and the lack of public information in many cases, the Chinese Long March 5B costs about $3000/kg, with a payload of about 25 metric tons. This puts Chinese launch vehicles behind SpaceX but ahead of everyone else. For example, United Launch Alliance, a U.S. launch provider, has the Vulcan Centaur, which costs about $4000/kg; Europe’s Ariane 5 costs about $9000/kg; and Russia’s Proton costs about $4300/kg. Without SpaceX, China would have the world’s cheapest satellite launch costs.
SpaceX uses metal 3D printing technology to produce reusable rocket engines, as well as complex arrays of sensors and control systems to enable vertical landing. China already has a robust capital equipment industry, including companies with 3D printers for metal. For example, upstart Chinese rocket maker Galactic Energy has been working with the Chinese 3D printing company Farsoon Technologies to develop fully reusable rocket engines.
While Chinese suppliers are almost certainly technologically behind SpaceX suppliers, the necessary machining systems, while advanced, will likely take just years, not decades, to develop. While successfully developing VTVL is a difficult engineering challenge, there is now a clear proof of possibility and a clear incentive to catch up.
To fulfill the more ambitious goals the Chinese government has set, they have to develop the capability to bring larger payloads to orbit and do it at an even lower cost per kilogram. Without such heavy and ultra-heavy launch vehicles, projects such as a manned Moon or even Mars mission become prohibitively expensive. The same is true of maintaining extended space infrastructure such as new space stations, orbital weapons, or satellite megaconstellations.
When it comes to more ambitious payloads, SpaceX is far and away the dominant launch provider both in the U.S. and globally. Falcon Heavy rockets are the cheapest option for super-heavy launches to energetically demanding orbits, delivering 50-64 metric tons to LEO and 27 tons to geostationary transfer orbit, which is used for communication and observation satellites that do not require low latency. Starship—the most ambitious rocket under development by SpaceX—is likely to achieve even better prices per kilogram with even more mass to orbit. Whether the United States maintains its role as the preeminent pioneer in space exploration and, hopefully, colonization and resource extraction will depend on whether the American space industry can stay decisively ahead of China.
Old American launch providers—namely Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman—are making relatively few and rather expensive launches every year. They continue to receive government contracts, such as satellite launches for the U.S. Space Force. The old guard of launch providers are also deeply involved in the super-heavy lift Space Launch System (SLS) under development for the Artemis program to return to the Moon. This expendable rocket, which is expected to cost in excess of $2 billion per launch with a capacity of 70-130 metric tons to LEO and 27-46 tons to lunar orbit, has faced constant delays and cost overruns. These dead player institutions are unlikely to ever catch up to SpaceX, so this is likely a waste of U.S. funding. There is, however, one notable alternative to SpaceX: Jeff Bezos’ Blue Origin successfully completed the first orbital launch of its partly reusable heavy-lift New Glenn rocket on January 16th.
The core institutions of the Chinese space industry have, in contrast, long been large state-owned enterprises. The Long March family of rockets that have been manufactured by such enterprises for over fifty years continue to be the workhorse of Chinese orbital launches. The China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) and the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) both maintain strong connections to defense technologies, from missiles to drones. These companies benefited massively from a transfer of Russian technology starting in the 1990s and continuing to the present day.
The Chinese manned space program in its current form began in 1992, laying out three initial goals: crewed orbital launches, a temporary orbital laboratory, and finally a more permanent space station. China worked closely with Russia, receiving capsule, docking system, and life support system hardware to reference for their designs. Chinese astronauts traveled to the Yuri Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center in Russia and passed on their knowledge to other astronauts back home. Even the Chinese permanent space station is largely based on the Soviet Mir station which operated from 1986 to 2001, although it is entirely Chinese-made and outfitted with more modern technology. Thus, successes ranging from the first Chinese astronaut, Yang Liwei, in 2003 to the completion of Tiangong in 2022 owe a great deal to direct assistance from Russia.
China even relied on a Russian launch vehicle for its first attempt at a Mars orbiter, hitching a ride with several other spacecraft in 2011. However, the rocket failed to exit its initial Earth orbit, leaving the payloads to slowly deorbit. China began its own independent Mars project, this time without Russian help. Sino-Russian collaboration remains active. For example, in a memorandum from early 2021, the Russian space agency Roscosmos and the China National Space Administration agreed to build an International Lunar Research Station by the mid-2030s, with many other nations signing on.
Having relied on Russian technology in the past does not mean that CASC and CASIC are dead players, like Boeing. The Tianwen-1 Martian rover is the only one to ever successfully deploy that wasn’t made by the United States. Crucially, they are pursuing the development of the Long March 9 as a fully reusable super-heavy lift rocket designed for manned lunar missions—a pivot from the original design and a clear response to Starship. Nor does it mean they can’t successfully commercialize their technology. For example, China’s GPS competitor, BeiDou, was completed in 2020, with dozens of thousand-kilogram satellites in geostationary and medium Earth orbit. Built in part by CASIC, along with other state entities, BeiDou’s capabilities are generally recognized to be superior to GPS, reflecting their newer technology. The network generates tens of billions of dollars in revenue for the state-owned and private-sector companies involved in its operation.
The Limits of Catch-Up Only Development
There is little reason to think that, given enough time and resources, Chinese engineers and scientists will be incapable of reinventing the many technologies that are currently the unique purview of U.S. entities. China has been extraordinarily successful in building up domestic industrial capacity in recent decades. It has built up industries ranging from chemicals to consumer electronics to shipbuilding, becoming a global manufacturing hub by blending market economics with trade barriers, subsidies, and strong export incentives.
However, this doesn’t necessarily translate into achieving technological dominance. China is at the forefront in some industries, such as electric cars, drones, and solar panels, but remains behind in others, such as high-end chips or drug development. Moreover, past Chinese successes in catching up to foreign producers often involved Western companies offshoring to mainland China, chasing the better margins of cheap labor—something that inevitably resulted in technological transfer.
That won’t work for space technologies. There was some U.S.-China space collaboration in the 1990s, but after the Cox Report in 1999 documented significant concerns over technology transfers to China, rules were tightened substantially. And since 2011, as a result of the Wolf Amendment included in every appropriations bill since, NASA’s contracted-out mission hardware cannot be made in China. Satellites and launch vehicles are also both regulated by both International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and Export Administration Regulations (EAR), requiring export licenses.
Industrial espionage efforts are undoubtedly underway on many fronts and are likely to achieve some results for China. However, by the time Chinese launch providers catch up to where SpaceX is today, the American company will have advanced further still. China may have an uphill battle to achieve technological supremacy over U.S. launch providers, at least for as long as frontier innovations continue to have compounding returns, as with SpaceX today.
There are, furthermore, some structural problems with the Chinese launch vehicle development process. The development cycles for new generations of Long March rockets have typically been quite long, similar to legacy defense contractors in the U.S. and other launch providers around the world, such as Arianespace in France or Roscosmos in Russia. CASC and CASIC have also typically been technologically conservative rather than modernizing as fast as possible. This is a notable contrast from other Chinese industries, in which private companies have made savvy bets with state backing to enter industries and end up ahead of the curve.
Failing to anticipate the disruptive innovation delivered by SpaceX, many next-generation Long March rockets are in the late stage of development, with enormous resources being sunk into them despite having no possibility of competing with reusable VTVL rockets. Nearly half of China’s 2024 launches were using older, less efficient, and highly toxic hypergolic fuels, and several new cryogenic fuel rockets are reaching maturity at a time when leapfrogging to reusable rockets might be more advantageous.
The past ten years have seen a push for further commercial forays into launch vehicles in China, with leaders including Orienspace, Landspace, Galactic Energy, and iSpace, but none have yet developed heavy or super-heavy lift vehicles, which start at over twenty tons of capacity. Commercial launch providers in China currently operate mostly with payloads under one metric ton, although Orienspace’s Gravity-1 rockets have an LEO payload of 6.5 tons and others are in development. These companies also have no autonomy to pursue their own ambitions in space. Rather, they have been given room to compete and grow with the infrastructure and parameters laid out by the central government.
In support of increased orbital launch capacity, China has gradually improved its spaceports. While its first three spaceports were constructed deep inland, far from the reach of foreign sabotage and surveillance, priorities have shifted towards efficiency. The newest Chinese spaceport is at Wenchang, which opened for operation in 2014 on the island of Hainan in the South China Sea. Instead of traveling long distances by rail from manufacturing centers, launch vehicles can now be transported by sea, allowing for much bigger rockets. The Wenchang spaceport is also closer to the equator, reducing the energy needed to escape Earth’s gravity. The Tianwen-1 Mars mission launched from the facility.
On January 25th, the second phase of a commercial launch facility with two new liquid rocket launch pads broke ground in Wenchang, aiming to reduce bottlenecks in launch facility access for commercial space companies. The five-meter-diameter Long March 10 rockets carrying manned lunar missions to space are planned to launch from Wenchang as well; a crewed lunar exploration site currently under construction at the same complex.
These moves to commercialization and ambitious new launch capacity haven’t overcome a fundamental weakness of the Chinese space industry: by having developed in a context of slow progress and clear pre-existing examples to follow, the industry is less adaptable than it needs to be for this moment, and perhaps even less able to chart its own course absent a roadmap drawn out by those who came before. Institutions designed for gradual, long-planned execution of technology development according to a template aren’t easily repurposed for rapid pivots.
Internally sourcing an independent vision for what one might create out of nothing, comparable to those of Sergei Korolev, Wernher von Braun, or Elon Musk, might prove difficult. While China is sure to have some wild geniuses among its increasingly well-educated workforce, they are not empowered in its space industry as things stand. It remains to be seen whether China’s elites are still adept enough at institutional reform to successfully emulate the new privatized U.S. model or alternatively politically empower an ideological and perhaps politically unreliable individual and put them in charge of the national space program—a key pillar of Chinese national security.
However, while few advanced technologies from the past century were first invented in China, today China manufactures many goods in larger quantities than any other nation. If China can build fully reusable rockets, even if they are smaller or less advanced and even if U.S. launch providers stay several years ahead, it will unlock vast possibilities.
The Windfall of a Second Space Race
Chinese satellite internet may or may not be better than that of U.S. companies, but they are very likely to complete megaconstellations made up of thousands of satellites providing service across vast parts of the globe, if only for their own national security needs. CNSA may well beat NASA’s Artemis to the Moon, and they will almost certainly achieve manned lunar landing at lower cost. If SpaceX does send humans to Mars, barring unlikely changes in the nature and interests of the governing regime, China will quite likely have the capability to reach Mars not too much later.
China is expanding the vision of its space program. For example, future stages of the Tianwen interplanetary exploration missions include sample returns from the atmosphere of Venus in the 2030s. NASA has plans for this too, perhaps sooner but perhaps not. Venus is closer than Mars, has more Earth-like gravity, and the upper layers of its atmosphere may be able to support habitable colonies—floating cities in the sky above the lightning storms and acid rains. However, our understanding of the exact composition and properties of its atmosphere remains incomplete. If NASA is too mismanaged to keep to project timelines, China may well fill the gap.
Regulatory structures in the U.S. remain relatively stifling for companies requiring extensive infrastructure buildout and frequent government approvals for test launches. The current Trump administration favors SpaceX, though the previous administration hampered them in a variety of ways because they perceived Elon Musk to be a political enemy. In the long term, much depends on whether SpaceX remains the only competitive player in U.S. or Western launch capabilities. While the company is currently led by a founder with a clear and motivating vision, companies, especially without good succession plans, tend not to perform well indefinitely.
The new space race between the U.S. and China will likely have its own positive externalities. American launch providers mostly don’t need to compete with Chinese launch providers on cost, nor vice versa, because the markets are mostly walled off from one another. However, the push to be the first and bring glory to your nation or demonstrate superior military capabilities often proves more compelling than simple curiosity when marshaling vast resources. Perhaps this new competition will prove enough to finally propel humanity across the Solar System.
Oberon Dixon-Luinenburg is a systems engineer, bioengineer, and researcher in political economy. He has published work on advanced manufacturing and the dynamics of industrial development. You can follow him at @oberondl.